

Energiewirtschaftliches Institut an der Universität zu Köln

Model-based Analysis of Infrastructure Projects and Market Integration in Europe with Special Focus on Security of Supply Scenarios

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Brussels, 14 June 2010



Part II – Results







- **1. Gas Infrastructure Model**
- 2. Simulation Assumptions
- 3. Scenarios
- **Part II Results**

TIGER In- and Outputs





TIGER Model Optimisation




Relevant assumptions:

- Minimisation of dispatch costs
- Results reflect efficient allocation, e.g. as obtained in a competitive market


(prerequisite: efficient organisation of transport and storage market)

I.e. results on gas flows assume that all efficient swaps have taken place




















*including projects


TIGER Inputs: Demand Data





TIGER Input: Supply Data






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
(1) General Supply Assumptions – EU production



Source: Own illustration based on ENTSOG (2009).

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(1) General Supply Assumptions – Pipeline Import Potential



*Only in Nabucco Scenarios Source: Own illustration.

- Norway: based on IEA (2008)
- Algeria / Lybia: pipeline capacities (utilisation 90 %)
- Russia: growth path agreed with ERGEG: 195 bcm in 2019
- Iran*: contracted volumes (Turkey + EGL contract)
- Caspian region*: SCpipeline expansion to 20 bcm (90 % utilis.)
- *in scenarios with Nabucco: increase of those volumes by 31 bcm per year

(1) General Supply Assumptions – Commodity Costs in 2019

Supply Source	Supply Cost at EU border [EUR / MWh]
Pipeline supplies:	
Norway*	6,24
Russia	8,73
Azerbajian**	8,26
Iran**	8,06
Algeria	7,13
Lybia	7,51
LNG (cif to Europe):	
Global Marginal Supplier	19,78
LNG to Europe	6,21


- Supply costs derived with EWI Global Gas Supply Model
- Volumes more important than costs for considerations in study
- LNG volumes considered with variation → higher or lower than pipeline supply costs

*Supply Cost at field; **Supply Cost at Turkish border.

Source: Own calculations based on Lochner & Bothe (2009).

(1) General Supply Assumptions – LNG vs. Pipeline






Source: EIA, IEA (2009); *Spot LNG reference Japan in 2008, US in 2009

2008 vs. 2009:

- Spot LNG prices potentially volatile
- 2008, tight market:
 - high prices in Japan / US, almost only contracted LNG to Europe
 - •relative prices reflect relative cost structures
- 2009 buyer's market: lots of spot LNG volumes to Europe
- Uncertainty
- One additional LNG scenario

(2) Demand Assumptions & Scenarios





- EU (2008) data as recognised reference publication by EC
- Adjustment for economic crisis (2009/10 demand decline)


>EWI/ERGEG Demand

 ENTSOG Demand case to ensure compara-bility and have high demand sensitivity

>ENTSOG Demand

 (Additional Peak Day) Simulations based on **ENTSOG** data)

(2) Peak Demand Day Assumptions




 Assumptions for the Peak Demand Day from ENTSOG (2009)

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- Average peak demand day: 206 % of average daily demand (or +40 % higher than average winter day demand)
- Some countries with especially high relative peak demand days: NL, DK, FR, but also RO, BE, LU
- Only small relative peak demand days in IT, IE, PT, PL, SI

(3) Assumption Infrastructure – Storage Capacities




 Total storage working gas volume in Europe (all countries in study):

ew

- •85 bcm in 2009
- additional capacities of 55 bcm until 2019 assumed (Total of 140 bcm)
- No variations across scenarios

Sources: Own illustration based on GSE, ERGEG (project steering group), IGU, storage operators.

(3) Assumption Infrastructure – LNG Capacities




 Total import capacitiy in EU-27 plus Turkey and Croatia:

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- •165 bcm in 2010
- •additional capacities of 114 bcm until 2019 assumed (Total of 280 bcm)
- Largest additions in Netherlands, Spain, France
- No variations across scenarios


(3) Import Pipeline Projects






(3) Import Pipeline Projects – Scenario Variations





(3) Major Intra-European Pipeline Projects










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Scenarios



• Six infrastructure variations:



• Two demand variations:





Part II – Results

- 1. Summary of Results
- 2. Gas Flow Analysis
- 3. Physical Market Integration
- 4. Security of Supply Sensitivities




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Scenarios



• Six infrastructure variations:




• Two demand variations:



Summary of Results (I)





- Due to mostly fixed supply assumptions, no major impact of infrastructure scenarios – except for LNG Glut
- Additional Southern Corridor volumes replace some LNG
- In ENTSOG demand scenarios, higher demand covered by higher LNG imports



Reference Simulation

- Western Europe: No permanent bottlenecks (except Denmark)
- Eastern Europe: Significant bottlenecks (Hungary, Balkans)
- Ukraine Transit Disruption
 - Reverse Flow Projects allow additional West-to-East gas flows
 - not sufficient to eliminate all supply disruptions
- Algerian Export Stop
 - Supply Cost increases in many European countries
 - no supply disruptions to consumers (with sufficiently filled storages filled and efficient market reaction)



Nord Stream II

- cannibalizes other import routes from Russia
- no significant contribution to SoS due to remaining West-to-East bottlenecks

Nabucco

- improves integration in Eastern Europe
- improves SoS for Ukraine Transit Disruption, but additional volumes not sufficient to eliminate all supply disruptions in this case


South Stream

- improves integration in Eastern Europe
- greatly enhances SoS for Ukraine Transit Disruption (alternative route to Ukraine -> redundant capacity and larger capacity than Nabucco)

LNG Glut

- Flow directions turning from East-to-West to West-to-East
- Additional congestion from Western to Central European countries





- Perfect foresight: Crisis known to the model in advance
- **Model**: Additional gas volumes stored prior to crisis
- Reality: storage volumes depend on market expectations and regulatory requirements




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Annual Gas Flows 2019






Main routes to supply the European gas market:

- Russian gas is imported via Nord Stream, Yamal and Transgas
- 2 Gas from Norway is transported to UK, FR, BE, DE/NL

Gas from Algeria to Italy and Spain

Absolute Change of Annual Gas Flows 2019



Infrastructure Scenario:

Nabucco vs. Reference

Demand Scenario:


EWI/ERGEG

- Nabucco basically replaces Russian gas volumes in South Eastern Europe (Blue Stream, imports via Romania)
- Indirect effects in Western Europe: less Russian gas to South East, more to Central and Western Europe
- Transgas flows
 increase towards
 Germany, Italy,
 France
 - Pipeline gas volumes routed further West



Annual Gas Flows 2019 – LNG Glut (EWI/ERGEG Demand)





With temporally low LNG prices:

- No gas via Nord Stream
- Low utilisation of Yamal and Transgas
- High utilisation of pipelines in France and Spain
- High/full utilisation of pipeline in Croatia (from Krk terminal)




Part I – Model Approach and Scenarios

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
Identification of (economic) bottlenecks

- ewi
- price differences vs. transport costs (between nodes)
- absolute value of price difference ≤ variable transport costs
 → no economic bottleneck
- absolute value of price difference > variable transport costs \rightarrow economic bottleneck




Bottlenecks





Unsupplied Demand due to bottlenecks







Denmark and Sweden

- All scenarios: demand in Denmark and Sweden exceeds import capacity plus domestic production (even on annual level)
- Persistent bottleneck: additional import capacity required

Eastern Europe

- Insufficient import capacity into Hungary if neither South Stream nor Nabucco in place, demand cannot be met (also true for Balkan countries)
- Some additional bottlenecks but with lower economic costs

Greece

- Import capacity insufficient on peak demand day (high demand in Turkey)
- Additional pipeline or LNG import capacity or storages might be necessary



Western Europe on peak demand day

- Benelux countries plus France: relative high peak demand day compared to average daily demand
- Relatively few storage sites or low withdrawal rates (Netherlands) compared to neighbouring countries (Germany, UK)
- On concurrent peak demand day → more gas transports from Germany and UK to this region would be economically viable

Low LNG Prices

- More transports from LNG terminals to central Europe possible if more westto-east capacity were available
- Especially from UK to continent and from France to Germany and Switzerland
- Economic costs depend on relative LNG and pipeline gas prices and likelihood of very low LNG prices over time

ewi

Model results:

- Some bottlenecks identified (=physical bottleneck with economic cost)
- However, most of them depending on scenario and time of consideration (winter vs. summer vs. peak day)

Open questions:

- What degree of physical market integration is desirable?
- What is the efficient amount of capital investment?
- Does the economic cost of the congestion exceed the cost of physical integration?
- Are there any additional positive "external" effects of market integration (apart from economic efficiency gains)?




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2009 Crisis simulated








Assumptions


- No transits via Ukraine
- Duration of 28 days in mid-January (including the peak demand day)






Infrastructure Scenario:






Infrastructure Scenario:





Infrastructure Scenario:






Infrastructure Scenario:

South Stream

Quantities to consumers switched off





Demand Disruption as Percentage of Daily Demand



(1) Replication of 2009 January Ukraine Crisis


- No transits via Ukraine
- Duration of 28 days in mid-January (including the peak demand day)

(2) Algerian export stop

- No exports by pipeline from Algeria for 28 days in mid-January (including the peak demand day)
- Reduction of total available LNG volumes to the EU by 25 percent during this time period
- Diversion of LNG ships from one EU country to another is assumed to be possible, albeit only after a several day reaction time period

Hypothetical Crisis: Algeria Suppy Disruption






Infrastructure Scenario:



Algeria Suppy Disruption – "Without MidCat" Scenario



Infrastructure Scenario:

South Stream



	Ukraine stress scenario										Algeria stress scenario									
Countries	Refer- ence		Nord Stream II		Nabucco		South Stream		DG TREN		Refer- ence		Nord Stream II		Nabucco		South Stream		DG TREN	
ES and FR																				
GB and BE																				
CZ and DE-S*																				
CZ and DE-E*																				
AT and DE																				
AT and IT					R				R											
AT and SI																				
IT and SI																				
HR and SI																				
HU and RO																				
AT and SK																				
CZ and SK	R	R		R	R	R				R										
BG and RO																				
BG and GR																				
BG and TR																				
GR and IT																				

*Czech border with south (Waidhaus) and east Germany (Olbernhau) respectively

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Ukraine crisis - bottlenecks:

on average winter day on peak demand day




Algeria crisis - bottlenecks: on average winter day on peak demand day



Conclusion: Summary of Bottlenecks in EWI Study and ENTSOG (2009) Study Comparison





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The full study is available for download at the website of ERGEG.

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